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(Marshall, 1., dissenting). Noting
that the only change in the four year
interim between the decisions in
Booth and Gathers and Payne was
the personnel ofthe Court, Marshall
maintained that the real inquiry
should be whether the majority satisfied the extraordinary showing of
special justification required before
overruling Court precedent. [d. at
2619-21.
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined
by Justice Blackmun, emphasized
that our capital punishment jurisprudence has allowed the sentencing jury to consider only mitigating
evidence concerning the offense and
the character of the defendant. [d. at
2626-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens asserted that evidence which served no purpose other
than appealing to the "sympathies
or emotions of the jurors has never
been considered admissible." [d. at
2626. The dissent accused the majority of abandoning the "rules of
relevance that are older than the
Nation itself." [d. at 2627.
With this decision, the Supreme
Court has overruled recently decided cases and disregarded precedent by holding victim impact evidence constitutionally permissible.
A state may now allow a sentencing
jury to consider victim impact evidence, and a prosecutor may argue
victim impactto the sentencingjury.
The Court's broad interpretation of
"relevant evidence" will have far
reaching implications for capital
defendants, the families oftheir victims, and to society as a whole.
- Belinda P. Gardner

42 - The Law Fomml22.1

Rust v. Sullivan: SUPREME
COURT UPHOLDS AGENCY
REGULATIONS PROHIBITING THE COUNSELING,
REFERRAL OR PROVISION
OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ABORTION AS A
METHOD OF FAMILY PLANNING.
In a five to four decision, the
Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan,
III S. Ct. 1759 (1991), upheldregulations of the Public Health Services Act requiring recipients oITitie
X funds to refrain from engaging in
abortion counseling, referral, and
provision of information concerning abortion as a method of family
planning. The Court gave extreme
deference to the Department of
Health and Human Services and
upheld the regulations on the ground
of statutory construction. In addition, the Court found the regulations were not violative ofthe First
or Fifth Amendments.
Title X ofthe Public Health Service Act, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to
300a-6), was originally enacted by
Congress in 1970 to provide federal
funding for family-planning services. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764. The
Act authorized the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (the
Secretary) to provide funding to
public or nonprofit private entities
to operate family planning projects.
The Secretary was also authorized
to promulgate such regulations as
deemed necessary to carry out the
intent of the statute. [d. (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 300(a), 300a-4 (1970».
Section 1008 of the Act provided
that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be
used in programs where abortion is
a method offamily planning." Rust,
111 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970».
In 1988, after determining that

current regulations failed to properly implement the statute, the Secretary promulgated new regulations
designed to provide "clear and operational guidance to grantees [of
Title X funds] to preserve the distinction between Title X programs
and abortion as a method of family
planning." Rust, IllS. Ct. at 1765
(quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-24
(1988». Specifically, the regulations attached three conditions for
receipt ofthe funds. First, the ''Title
X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion
as a method of family planning or
provide referral for abortion as a
method of family planning." Rust,
III S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting42C.F.R.
§ 59.8(a)(I». Second, recipients of
Title X funds may not engage in
activities that "encourage, promote
or advocate abortion as a method of
family planning." [d. (quoting 42
C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989». Third,
the Title X project must be "physically and financially separate" from
any prohibited activity so that an
"objective integrity and independence from prohibited activities"
remains. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765
(quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989».
The petitioners in this action were
grantees of Title X funds suing on
behalf of themselves and their patients. The petitioners challenged
the facial validity ofthe new regulations on grounds that they were not
authorized by Title X and violated
the First and Fifth Amendment rights
of Title X patients and the First
Amendment rights ofTitle X health
care providers. The District Court
for the Southern District of New
York granted summary judgment in
favor of the Secretary. Both the
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court
first addressed the Secretary's au-

thority to promulgate the regulations, and then reviewed the validity
ofthe regulations and their constitutional ramifications. The Court
found the language of section 1008,
which provided that no Title X funds
be appropriated where abortion is a
method of family planning, to be
ambiguous. Id. at 1767. The Court,
therefore, reaffirmed the principle
that if a statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the
statute." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767
(quoting Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837,842-43 (1984)).
Accordingly, the Court looked
to the legislative history of the Act
for guidance. Finding that the history did not illuminate the meaning
of section 1008, the Court held the
Secretary's interpretation of the
regulations should be accorded substantial deference, and, thus, such
interpretation was apermissible construction of the statute. Id. at 1768.
In so doing, the Court rejected petitioners arguments that deference was
improper because the agency's 1988
regulations were in sharp contrast to
prior regulations of the same statute. Id. at 1769. The Court stated
that an agency "must be given ample
latitude to adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of changing
circumstances." Id (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass 'n v. State
Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42 (1983)). Because the
Secretary's regulations were based
on critical reports of the General
Accounting Office and the Office of
the Inspector General, as well as a
"shift in the attitude against the elimination of unborn children by abortion," the Court found the 1988
changes were justified. Rust, 111 S.
Ct. at 1768.

The petitioners also challenged
the "program integrity" requirement
ofthe regulations on the ground that
it frustrated the expressed intent of
Congress that Title X programs be
an integral part of a ''broader, comprehensive, health-care system." Id.
The Court again found the legislative history to be lacking, and afforded great deference to the Secretary in finding the regulation permissible. Id. at 1770.
Turning to the constitutional
ramifications ofthe regulations, the
Court held that while the constitutional arguments were not without
force, ''they do not carry the day."
Id. at 1771. The Court found section 1008 did not violate the First
Amendment, because the government may "make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion,
and ... implement that judgment by
the allocation of public funds." Id.
at 1772 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464,474 (1977)).
In addition, forbidding the counseling, referral, and provision of
abortion information is constitutional as these provisions ensure
that the ambit of Title X remains
within the limited scope of providing services for family planning.
"When the government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program." Rust, 111 S.
Ct. at 1773.
Finally, the Court held that although the traditional doctor-patient
relationship is entitled to greater
First Amendment protection, even
when subsidized by the government,
the 1988 regulations did not seriously impinge on that relationship.
The Court emphasized that since the
Title X program does not provide
post-conception care, "a doctor's
silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the

doctor does not consider abortion an
appropriate option for her." Id. at
1776.
Moreover, the Court held that
the regulations did not violate a
woman's Fifth Amendment right to
choose whether to terminate her
pregnancy. Reaffirming the principle set forth in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court
stated that ''the Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right
to governmental aid, even where
such aid may be necessary to secure
life, liberty, or property interests of
which the government itself may
not deprive the individual." Rust,
111 S. Ct. at 1776 (quoting Webster
v. ReproductiveHealthServices, 109
S.Ct. 3040 (1989)).
In justifying this principle, the
Court stated that the government,
by choosing not to fund abortion
services, is leaving women in the
same position as if it had decided
not to provide any family planning
services at all. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at
1777. Because the regulations in no
way impede a woman's right to
receive an abortion or a doctor's
right to provide abortion related information and services outside the
TitleX context, the regulations were
found constitutional. Id.
In a strong dissent joined by
Justices Marshall, O'Connor, and
Stevens in part, Justice Blackmun
argued that the constitutional issues
should not have been reached. In his
opinion, the Secretary exceeded his
statutory authority by promUlgating
the regulations. Id. at 1778
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun charged the majority with
failing to adhere to the cannon that
federal statutes must be construed
so as to avoid "serious doubt oftheir
constitutionality." Id. Because the
regulations raised serious questions
of First and Fifth Amendment rights,
Justice Blackmun believed they
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should have been struck down on
the grounds of constitutional construction. Id. at 1779.
Justice Blackmun next addressed
the constitutional issues ofthe case,
because he strongly disagreed with
the disposition of the majority. In
his opinion, the regulations imposed
viewpoint based restrictions on the
protected speech between a doctor
and his patient, and, thus, unconstitutionally impeded a woman's ability to obtain abortion related services. Id. at 1784-85. Commenting
on the majority's opinion, Justice

Blackmun stated that "[t]his is a
course nearly as noxious as overruling Roe directly, for if a right is
found to be unenforceable, even
against flagrant attempts by the government to circumvent it, then it
ceases to be a right at all." Id. at
1786.
The majority opinion in Rust v.
Sullivan, takes the Court one step
closer to overruling Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and makes it
nearly impossible for indigent
women to gain access to abortion
information and services. While the

government may be under no obligation to provide such services, it
has an obligation to continue them
once provided. In addition, this
Court upheld a governmental regulation that denies women full access
to medical information, thereby endangering and jeopardizing both
their life and lifestyle. The Court's
decision makes it nearly impossible
for physicians receiving Title X
funds to fulfill their Hippocratic oath,
as they are banned from informing a
patient of all safe options concerning her pregnancy.
- Laura Melia
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FALL "A.M. LAW" SEMINAR SERIES CONCLUDES
This year's Hyman and Isidore Ginsberg" A.M. Law" Seminar Series concludes on November 17
with a presentation by University of Baltimore Professors Anne Pecora and Jean Tullius, entitled
"Securing and Safeguarding Seniors' Rights: An Overview of Elder Law." The seminar begins at 7 :45
a.m. and takes place in the Moot Court Room located on the first level of the Law School. This seminar
is focused on giving a basic grounding in the laws you need to know to advise and protect your clients
or their parents. For reservations, please call the University of Baltimore Alumni Office at (410) 3332726. The spring "A.M. Law" series will continue on February 16, 1993.
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